The Qualitative Report
Volume 7

Number 4

Article 1

12-1-2002

Using Metaphor to Make Sense and Build Theory in Qualitative
Analysis
Peter Aubusson
University of Technology Sydney, peter.aubusson@uts.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr
Part of the Quantitative, Qualitative, Comparative, and Historical Methodologies Commons, and the
Social Statistics Commons

Recommended APA Citation
Aubusson, P. (2002). Using Metaphor to Make Sense and Build Theory in Qualitative Analysis. The
Qualitative Report, 7(4), 1-14. https://doi.org/10.46743/2160-3715/2002.1962

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the The Qualitative Report at NSUWorks. It has been
accepted for inclusion in The Qualitative Report by an authorized administrator of NSUWorks. For more
information, please contact nsuworks@nova.edu.

Using Metaphor to Make Sense and Build Theory in Qualitative Analysis
Abstract
This paper proposes analogical mapping as a strategy for data analysis. Research is often messy. Where
it explores the unknown and follows unexpected paths it often generates unanticipated findings.
Presented with extensive data and the initial analysis describing 'themes' the researcher asks, "What does
it all mean?" Thus we are challenged to make sense of the world we see, to theorise and not merely
describe. This report outlines a method of analysis using metaphor as a thinking tool to interpret findings
from a study in education. In the study reported here, metaphor provided a means of analysis to delve
deeply into the nature of a school system, to offer insights and to generate a tentative theory

Keywords
Analogy, Metaphor, Qualitative Analysis, and Educational Change

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License.

Acknowledgements
The author thanks Mark Cosgrove and Lyn Schaverien for their advice on the method considered in this
paper.

This article is available in The Qualitative Report: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol7/iss4/1

Using Metaphor to Make Sense and Build Theory in
Qualitative Analysis
by
Peter Aubusson+
The Qualitative Report, Volume 7, Number 4 December, 2002

Abstract
This paper proposes analogical mapping as a strategy for data analysis. Research is often messy.
Where it explores the unknown and follows unexpected paths it often generates unanticipated
findings. Presented with extensive data and the initial analysis describing 'themes' the researcher
asks, "What does it all mean?" Thus we are challenged to make sense of the world we see, to
theorise and not merely describe. This report outlines a method of analysis using metaphor as a
thinking tool to interpret findings from a study in education. In the study reported here, metaphor
provided a means of analysis to delve deeply into the nature of a school system, to offer insights
and to generate a tentative theory.
Key Words: Analogy, Metaphor, Qualitative Analysis, and Educational Change

Introduction
Research, that genuinely explores the unknown can be messy (Chenail, 1997; Gunstone, White,
& Fensham, 1988). As researchers, we are challenged to make sense of the mess sense (Chenail,
1997), to interpret the data and findings by identifying trends and theories to explain and predict.
Roberts (1996, p. 244) has expressed reservations about research reports, and qualitative research
in particular. He implies that they are often limited to description where they should create a
fresh 'conceptual framework ... by understanding and explaining events and phenomena better,
more deeply and more systematically'. This article outlines a method of qualitative interpretation,
analogical mapping using metaphor, which aims to provide such conceptual frameworks and to
facilitate the communication of ideas.
The metaphors discussed in this report, to illustrate this process of analysis, were used to
interpret the findings of a case study of a school science department that was attempting change.
First, the problem associated with analysing the large volume of diverse data produced in
qualitative research is considered. Second, the case for analogical mapping as a device for
providing a conceptual framework to interpret research findings is made, by considering analogy
as a thinking tool and by proposing the use of analogical mapping as a means of interpreting data
and research findings. Third, the process of analogical analysis is illustrated by its application to
a case study of a school science department. Finally, the sequence of steps involved in the
analogical analysis is summarised as an exemplar for application to other research.

The Problem

A school science department, eight teachers, was attempting to introduce a constructivist
approach to its teaching of science. To understand the process of change I investigated the
influences that affected these teachers as they attempted their change. Data were obtained, over
more than 15 months. As researcher, I visited the school one day per week for the first eight
weeks of the study, then four days per week for ten weeks and at least one day per week for the
remainder of the study. During these visits I recorded observations in and out of science classes,
interviews and discussions between researcher teachers and students, and collected artifacts.
These research procedures, applied over a long period, are effective ways of finding out how a
particular culture (in this case members of this school science culture) views their world. Hence,
this research could be positioned cognitive anthropology (D'Andrade, 1995).
The change the teachers were attempting was a shift from a range of individual teaching
approaches (including transmission and process-led approaches) to a constructivist teaching
approach, specifically an interactive teaching approach described in Osborne and Freyberg,
(1985). The way in which the constructivist teaching was in harmony with or discordant with
these teachers' existing views of science education, and other policies, traditions and practices in
the school became one focus of the study. The long term and varied techniques of data collection
resulted in a massive, untidy mess of information, as is often the case in this type of research
(Gunstone, White, & Fensham, 1988).
In an attempt to 'make sense' (Chenail, 1997) of this mess and understand the system being
studied. The data was analysed as recommended by Erickson (1986) to identify influences on the
attempted change. I mapped all the identified influences and used arrows among these to produce
a web of interconnecting factors as a diagram. This attempt to describe and explain the function
of the science education system produced an ever-growing network that graduated from A4
paper to A3 paper to a sheet of butcher's paper to sheets of butcher's paper stuck on my office
wall. And, it never satisfactorily explained what was happening. The interconnectedness of all
the varied factors in the system seemed to defeat this method of description and analysis. (A not
uncommon experience, it seems, for many PhD students who embark on qualitative research.)
The network produced was like an incredibly complicated food web where pulling any 'string' in
the network eventually tugged at every other factor identified. It was a product only the
researcher could love and one which failed to communicate my ideas to others.
The interpretation portrayed the complexity but failed to provide new insights to enrich or extend
existing theory by merely offering 'a degree of complexity but little discovery' the analysis was at
a low level of qualitative research according to criteria outlined by Kearney (2001, p. 146). I
sought a different way of analysing and describing the data and findings through analogical
mapping. Analogical mapping was not determined as the method of analysis a prioi. As argued
below, however, this means of analysis was well suited to the underlying philosophy and purpose
of the research that set out to interpret, understand and explain rather than merely describe. Thus
the method of analysis is consistent with first principles proposed for judging the quality of
analysis in qualitative research (Drisko, 1997; Garratt & Hodkinson, 1998; Seale, 1999).

Thinking

Analogies are valuable thinking tools because they allow unknown phenomena to be understood
in terms of well know phenomena (Badcock, 1995). In science, for example, analogical
reasoning is common place, a well respected way of thinking and modelling and often used as a
device in communication (Dunbar, 1997; Eisenberg, 1992; Gentner et al., 1997; Holyoak &
Thagard, 1995; Kurtz et al., 1999; Markman & Gentner, 1996). Consider Huygens view of light,
for example, '(Light) spreads', he wrote, 'As sound does, by spherical surfaces and waves: for I
call them waves from their resemblance to those which are seen to be formed on water when a
stone is thrown into it' (cited in Eisenberg, 1992, p.144). Note that in this extract, the similarities
between water waves and light are mapped one against the other identifying similarities and that
these mappings provide insight into the nature of light (the unknown) through the well known
and well understood phenomena of water waves. This analogical reasoning is a 'strong method'
of reasoning, according to Kurtz et al. (1999), because it makes use of specific or abstract
represented knowledge but its effectiveness depends on an appropriate source of knowledge
being present. Thus, availability and selection of an appropriate analogue, as a source of
knowledge, is critical in analogical analysis.

Mapping
Analogy is made up of two parts, the target analogue, which is the domain to be explained, and
the base analogue, which is the domain that serves as a source of knowledge (Gentner, 1983,
1989). Both domain and base are analogues, things that are compared. If an analogy is to be
valuable in producing knowledge, then the worth of the analogy does not lie simply in the overall
number of similarities between target and base. The central requirement is that "a relational
structure that normally applies in one domain can be applied in another domain" (Gentner, 1983,
p. 156). Relational structures are attributes of the base and target that associate a similar causal
relationship. They reveal a similar process and allow similar interpretations of base and target.
Analogies may also have literal attributes Gentner (1983, p. 159).
The difference between a literal and a relational attribute can be illustrated by example.
Aubusson and Cosgrove (1997) use the analogy of the teacher as nomad. The nomads served as
the base and the teachers as the target. Consider the following selected attributes of the analogy.
In the nomads' ritual (Bronowski, 1974), they traverse six rivers and accept high losses in their
stock as a inevitable consequence of their way of life. Similarly, the teachers studied 'herded'
their student cohorts through six years of secondary schooling. Each year their students had to
'traverse exams' and the teachers were tolerant of high rates of failure. The six rivers could be
considered an attributes equivalent to the six years of secondary schooling but the number of
obstacles, six, is merely a match of literal features with no explanatory power. By contrast, the
acceptance of high culls by both the teacher and nomad as part of their way of life, suggests a
causal relationship, derived from the nomad analogy, about the nature of schooling. The literal
analogy provides a match that only illustrates a trivial similarity of appearance. By contrast
relational similarities provide a system of connected knowledge for comparison.
The exploration of relational similarities allows the process of reasoning to be transferred from
one domain to another, to infer causes and processes in a target analogue. Relational structures
provide access to an existing knowledge system in the base. High order mappings (Gentner,
1983) generate deeper understanding of the target. Such deeper understanding characterises high-

level qualitative research (Kearney, 2001). In analogical mapping, high-level interpretation is
characterised by mapping relationships, reasoning and argument rather than the mere
identification of similar attributes in objects. In selecting an analogy for mapping, then, we seek
a metaphor with extensive relational correspondence rather than simply many similarities.
The problem of the initial analysis of the data in this research was that it merely described and
communicated this description poorly. By contrast, analogical mapping provided a means to shift
to a higher level of qualitative research (Kearney, 2001, p. 148) where interpretation of data
might 'convey new meaning' or 'reveal something unknown'. Analogical mapping does this not
by mapping a uncharted landscape but by viewing the landscape in another way, just as
alternative maps, street maps, topographical maps, relief maps and land use maps reveal and
explore different features of geography. In this way, it provides one path to 'discovery' - 'the
presentation by researchers of new perspectives on … human phenomena', as defined by
Kearney (2001, p.146).
Analogies can be mapped against phenomena (Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Hesse, 1966) to describe
and identify: similarities - where there is a correspondence between the phenomena and analogy;
differences - where the analogy and phenomena under study are fundamentally different; and
ambiguities - inconclusive areas where the correspondence between analogy and phenomena is
unclear. Analogical mapping provides a way of bringing an established, well-understood theory
to bear on data about new situations and events. Gick and Holyoak (1983) recommend that
analogical mapping be divided into two stages, an initial mapping and a second more extensive
mapping. The purpose of the initial mapping is to find a analogue with a potential to provide
insight into the target domain.

Initial Mapping
Initial mapping identifies the obvious general features of the phenomena, case or episode under
study. It then looks for a match between these features in the target and base analogue. When this
is found, the well-understood base analogue is elaborated in detail. This allows other similarities
and differences between the target and base to be identified. These steps in analogical mapping
are illustrated below.

Initial Mapping
The purpose of this initial mapping is to find an appropriate analogue to interpret the target (a
school science department). The general features of the phenomena under study, the school
science system, were identified (Aubusson, 1998). These were:
1. Complexity - a huge range of interconnected factors influenced what teachers did as they
attempted change.
2. Stasis - despite the attempt to radically change, there was little long term change evident
in the school. The teachers taught at the end of the study much as they had at the
beginning, though minor variations emerged. This stasis appeared to result from dynamic
resistance to change derived from the complex interconnectedness of factors in the
system.

3. Unpredicatability and gradual subtle change (later described as evolution).
Using these features, analogues were sought which might provide insights into the science
education system. These were then subjected to a first mapping seeking a one to one
correspondence between these listed features and the analogue. Some were tried and rejected.
Analogues were sought in chemistry and physics, for example. Le Chatelier's principle was
mapped against these features of school science and, while it provided insights regarding
equilibrium, it could not explain the characteristic of unpredictability. Similarly, inertia resulting
from balanced forces seemed to lack the complexity and dynamism of the school system. An
analogue was sought in biology because biology provided systems with these difficult to explain
characteristics, 'living systems are characterised by a remarkably complex organisation ... (with)
a steady-state balance in spite of much input and output. This homeostasis is made possible by
elaborate feedback mechanisms, unknown in their precision in any inanimate system' (Mayr,
1988, p. 14). Thus a biological analogy suggested a potential to shift from models based on
'simple cause and effect to … thinking dealing with complex interactions' (Kelly, 1994, p. 2).
Homeostasis is built upon the connectedness within a biological system (a connectedness evident
in the school system under study) and the ultimate level of biological 'organisation' is the
ecosystem. In Miller's (1975) description of ecosystem, he identified the very factors identified
in this case study of the school system: complexity, stasis, variation and, paradoxically, gradual
change. In an ecosystem) everything is connected to everything; everything feeds back through
the ecosystem on itself. The interconnectedness preserves the overall system. The natural
tendency of any complex ... ecosystem is to maintain a dynamic steady state despite
environmental stresses, changes and shocks. Even where stresses are too great ... a biotic
community can evolve a new steady state in balance with changed environmental conditions (p.
77). This initial mapping revealed a good relational match and this suggested that an ecosystem
might be a fruitfully explored as the base in an extended analogical analysis of the case study.

Detailed Mapping
Having established the one to one correspondence in this first mapping of general features, the
next stage was a move to a more detailed mapping by mapping the school science system against
an elaborate representation of an ecosystem. The purpose of this is to use what we know about an
ecosystem to inform our interpretation of the school system. As a heath ecosystem was well
known to me it provided a well-understood analogical base from which to identify attributes of
an ecosystem. These attributes were identified and refined by eliminating literal similarities to
expose similarities with potential as 'relational structures' (Gentner, 1983). That is, overlaps were
sought which may reveal matching, causal relationships in the base that might be transferred to
the target. Potential, relational features of the heath ecosystem (Aubusson, 1998) are stated
briefly below:
•
•

Complexity of interactions in that there are the many interrelationships among plants,
animals and their surroundings.
Homeostasis such as the heath's capacity for self-maintenance and perpetuation in spite
of stresses.

•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Succession where over a long time communities change their environment making it
more suited to other types communities than themselves. Different stages of succession
are present in different parts of the ecosystem at the same time.
Fitness such as a sundew's carnivorous adaptation to impoverished soil.
Generation - regeneration, in that the heath ecosystem generates itself from within
through succession and regenerates itself in response to fire.
Opportunism when for example the house mouse exploits the short term plentiful food
and altered environment after fire resulting in a rapid growth in population.
Reproductive maturity in that species, if they are to survive, have to pass on information
present in their genetic code to successive generations.
Fragility when changes in the frequency of fire can eliminate species.
Evolution as organisms have evolved through natural selection of variations, generating
fitter species.
Purpose in that the organisms function as if there is an unconscious purpose, the survival
of the species [after Plotkin, 1994] through such adaptations as the Banksia's production
of nectar 'to' attract animals 'to' pollinate its followers.
Knowledge present in the gene pool [after Plotkin, 1994] which enables it to respond to
its environment).

This outline of ecosystem brings to the fore biological propositions of adaptation, evolution and
interactions among organisms and their environment, These characteristics, paradoxically,
maintain robust stasis but allow, fragile, unpredictable change.
These attributes of this ecosystem were then mapped onto the case study to identify the
similarities, differences and ambiguities (after Hess, 1966). For the purposes of this paper, which
only uses the case study to illustrate the method of analysis, only two mappings will be
considered in brief. The first attribute, complexity, is a relational similarity, the second, purpose,
illustrates ambiguity. These examples show how the well-known analogue provides an extensive
knowledge base to interpret the case under study.

Complexity
This school science system is complex. The complexity could be seen in many different
interacting features of the school's science education system. There were interactions among the
following: the teachers competing views of purposes, teaching and learning; the different official
(state syllabus and school program), taught and learned curricula; aspects of conflicting
teaching/learning paradigms such as behaviourism, constructivism, objectivism and inquiry; the
tension between the learning a set of science processes and knowledge acquisition; and aspects
of school, science department and teacher practices unsympathetic to constructivism, such as
methods of assessment and reporting. These complex interactions operated across organisational
levels (state, school, science department and class) paradigms (views of teaching learning and
teaching); and purposes (evident in teachers views, school programs and State syllabus). These
complex interactions maintained the conditions such that little changed. The constructivist
change teachers sought was counteracted by dynamic interactions in the complex system
including: assessment processes emphasising the measurement of accurate recall rather than the
social and individual construction of knowledge; the organisation of learning in fixed blocks of

time rather than fexibility recognising that students have different backgrounds and capacities
which, among other things, led to students requiring different amounts of time to learn; and
remnants of behaviourism, such as learning described in terms of behavioural objectives, which
reduced the indicators of cognition to simple predicted behaviours. The interconnectedness of
these features produced a steady state system, stable and resistant to change.

Purpose
The teachers revealed that they held many purposes for science education which arise from
competing pressures. These included that students, learn to think, learn science facts, work things
out for themselves, learn process skills, appreciate science, perform well in exams etc. These
purposes are eclectic and not always consistent with each other. By contrast, the ecosystem
functions as if it has a single purpose. The organisms function as if their purpose is to ensure
survival of the species. This notion of purpose in evolution has been contentious among
biologists, according to Williams (1993) and Ayala (1993). Yet, natural selection serves a
purpose (Ayala, 1993; Williams, 1993) though the preferred terminology for purpose is teleology
or teleomy rather than purpose. Williams (1993) explains
...the designation of something as the means or mechanism for a certain goal or function or
purpose will imply that the machinery involved was fashioned by selection for the goal attributed
to it... This is a convention in general use already, perhaps unconsciously ... Thus I would say
that reproduction and dispersal are the goals or functions or purposes of apples and that the apple
is a means or mechanism by which such goals are realised by the apple trees. (pp.182-183)
The organisms in the heath ecosystem survive because everything that happens serves this
survival imperative; for instance, setting seeds and growth responses to fire. This singular
purpose, survival, in the heath seems to distinguish it from the science education system where
the purposes identified in the case study are many and intentional. In purpose, the relationship
between the analogue and this school science system seems inconclusive and requires further
consideration.
Consider the three types of teleology in biology identified by Ayala (1993, pp.189-190). The first
of these, intended teleology, is actions or objects that are purposeful in that the end state is
consciously intended by an agent (for example, a person mowing a lawn or a lion pack hunting
antelope). In the second, there is artificial teleology where objects are the result of purposeful
behaviour (for example, a bird's nest or a knife). The third is natural teleology, in which features
are not the result of the intended, purposeful action of an agent but natural process (for example,
the wings of birds which serve an end, flying).
Purpose, an apparently inconclusive feature of the mapping, seems in the school science system
to be intended but in the heath to be natural. However, like the adaptations in the heath, this
school science system is also a natural teleology. If the purpose of education is to promote the
survival of the human species through the transfer and development of knowledge across
generations (and extended nurturing among humans has long been considered an adaptation by
biologists) then science education (a part of this nurturing survival strategy) is a natural
teleology. In purpose, there is a contentious parallel between this science education and the heath

ecosystem analogue. In biology, natural selection, through courtship, has resulted in
characteristics that are, other than in courtship, disadvantageous. Consider for example, the
oversized tail feathers of the peacock, the huge antlers of the extinct Irish elk and the excessive
bulk of the male sea lion. Has schooling similarly gradually evolved through selection to develop
characteristics fundamentally inimical to its teleological purpose? For example, have its testing
regimes, rigid timetables and timelines and packed curriculum evolved for sound reasons, such
as ensuring rigorous education but might they inhibit the teleological, purpose - learning?
There may be some relational parallel that informs our understanding of schooling. However, the
multiplicity of sub-purposes and the pre-eminence of intended purposes in the school science
system, which may not contribute to this primary drive for survival, are not consistent with the
ecosystem analogy. Analogy Conclusion
Mapping the heath ecosystem analogy onto the school science system identified relational
similarities (e.g., complexity) and contentious features (e.g., purpose) and has resulted in an
ecological model of stasis and change in education (Aubusson, 1998) Some similarities
identified in the analysis provided insights into the functioning of school science and had
implications for research. In particular, the ecological notions of reproductive maturity,
adaptation and fragility can explain the varied impacts of attempted innovation in school science.
Specifically, a 'new' teaching approach might thrive for a short time in a trial school, if supported
by sufficient energy or in exploitation of opportunity, but it is unlikely to survive in the long
term. Analogically, a new teaching approach is an exotic species, which has not evolved in the
school to which it is introduced. It is less well adapted to the existing environment than are the
established 'species', practices and procedures. It rarely reaches reproductive maturity, a point at
which the ideas and practices are dispersed among other teachers and in other schools. It may
flourish briefly but it is fragile and usually dies (Aubusson, 1998). In this article, the nature of
purpose in an ecosystem has resulted a consideration of the purpose of schooling and raised
questions about how the fundamental purpose may be derailed as a result of 'natural' selection.

Trusting Analogy
Although well established as way of thinking and interpreting the world, the formal application
of analogical mapping in qualitative research in the social sciences is atypical. Hence an
important consideration is how the trustworthiness and quality of analogical analysis may be
judged. This is considered in detail in Aubusson (1998). I consider trustworthiness here to assert
the quality of this research (as required by Drisko, 1997; Garratt & Hodkinson, 1998; Seale,
1999) but also to promote discussion on this novel method of analysis.
First, recognise that in this research, analogical mapping initially interprets principal findings and
only then raw data sets. Thus a first step in establishing the worth of the analogical mapping
depends on the same principles or criteria for collecting and analysing data outlined in the many
articles and books on qualitative research (e.g., Drisko, 1987; Garratt & Hodkinson, 1998;
Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Seale, 1999). This paper does not set out to provide a 'complete' report
(after Drisko, 1997) of the data or research project. Rather it deals primarily with analogical. In
early sections of this paper the principles guiding the selection and testing of the analogy against
data and findings have been outlined. The reader is perhaps best placed to make a judgement on

the value of the analysis based on this research report and its relevance to other settings (Seale,
1999). Nevertheless, researchers should make explicit their reasons for their interpretive
judgements and provide evidence that these judgements have been subjected to scrutiny (Garratt
& Hodkinson, 1998). Here, I will limit the discussion to just two strategies related to judging the
worth of the analogical mapping (by means other than testing for its consistency and
inconsistency with research data and findings, which has already been discussed). These two
strategies are checking by participants, peers and experts; and interpreting other cases.

Expert, Peer, and Participant Checking
Analogical mapping sets out to communicate ideas and render phenomena more understandable.
It follows that 'good' analogical mapping should help others to make sense of the phenomena
under study. I set out to scrutinise the extent to which this was achieved as part of the research
process by discussing data and my analysis with peers in a university research group, experts in
science education and change, reporting the interpretation to the teachers involved in the study
and reporting the analytical interpretation to meetings of other science teachers and academics.
This procedure provided a check on the interpretation by those who shared direct knowledge of
the phenomena, the teachers in the school studied, as well as those with knowledge of similar
contexts, other teachers, members of the research groups and academics at conferences. The
overwhelming response of these was the recognition of features of this analogy in their own
contexts. Where criticisms were raised or alternative interpretations were suggested these were
explored and tested against data and findings. The discussion of 'purpose' outlined in this paper
was the result of one such criticism; a criticism which had to be tested against the data by
looking for confirming and contradictory instances. Thus, one test of 'goodness' is peer review
both by experts and participants in the research and evidence that alternative interpretations and
criticism have been examined in light of data and findings.

Interpreting Other Cases
If the ecological interpretation is to be useful it needs to have relevance in settings other than that
studied. One of my main concerns about the analogy was that it predicted both stagnation and the
potential for radical change. Yet the metaphor was derived from a case characterised by
stagnation and little change. In the ecological view proposed, organisms and particularly humans
change aspects of their environment. (The first life on earth altered the atmosphere, plants
change the moisture and organic content of soil, beavers build dams and humans shape the
environment to meet needs and exploit opportunity.) So far, this ecological interpretation might
suggest that the school and ecosystem only prevent change by selecting species/ideas that fit and
maintain the existing system. However, the metaphor also suggests that change does, has and
will occur.
In this research, the analogy was tested by reinterpreting findings of two well researched projects
where significant change in the teaching of science had been reported, the Project to Enhance
Effective Learning (PEEL) (see Baird & Mitchell, 1986; Baird & Northfield, 1992) and the
Learning in Science Project (LISP) (see Bell, 1993; Bell & Gilbert, 1996). The interpretation of
these two other cases is reported in detail in Aubusson (1998) and briefly in Aubusson and
Cosgrove (1997) where it was concluded that the ecosystem metaphor, through introduced

species and the application of energy and resources, could explain radical change as well as
stagnation in a school system.

Limitations
There are many different ways of interpreting and reporting research. I do not assert that all
research be analysed analogically. Indeed, all data and findings do not lend themselves to
analogy. A well understood base analogue may not be available as a source of established theory.
Even where available it may prove unproductive. Note that in this research a number of
unproductive anologues were tried. When seeking dense, descriptions analogical mapping is not
a substitute for phenomenology, phemoneography, narrative, and evocative or fictional accounts.
Analogical analogy comes after initial analysis and reporting to provide another means of
analysis and an alternative way to view the phenomena under study. Where the researcher is
satisfied with the explanation yielded by other methods and judges that the outcomes of the
research are evident and readily communicated then analogical analysis may be unnecessary.
However, where a more parsimonious explanation is sought and clear grounded theory proves
difficult to generate, analogical mapping provides a way of bringing established knowledge to
bear on the problem. It provides another layer to interpret, communicate and increase
understanding of human contexts. Used without a thorough, initial interpretation of the data, it is
just as likely to mislead as to provide insights.
Qualitative researchers are usually very sensitive to the context bound nature of their research
and findings, often leaving it to the reader to judge their applicability to other contexts (Seale,
1999). Yet, transferability is often important to consumers of research who want to make use of
grounded knowledge in other settings (Drisko, 1997). In this research the metaphor was tested
against two other similar cases. These two cases were selected for specific reasons, first they
were dissimilar to the case under study in that they reported radical change but they were very
similar to the case examined in this research in that they were promoting a very similar
constructivist approach, in similar secondary schools, in similar settings. The use of metaphor (in
this study, school science as ecosystem,) identifies key relational similarities between two sets of
information. This brings to the fore features, principles, perhaps a comprehensive theory
explaining data and findings. For example, aspects of evolutionary theory and ecology are
tentatively proposed as a way to understand observations of school science in one school - one
context, one setting. The metaphor provides a set of propositions that can then be considered in
other settings. Discussions with researchers in the field of science education and educational
change, as well as the examination of two other cases, indicate that the ecological metaphor
provides an effective device for the communication of ideas. Many researchers have commented
that they recognise that a similar interpretation has relevance to educational settings they have
studied. However, further research is required before asserting any broad application to other
examples of science education and attempted change.

Conclusion
Analogical mapping provided a means of interpreting the findings of a qualitative study and gave
rise to unexpected insights into the nature of school science. Although analogical mapping need
not rigidly follow a set of steps, the sequence of analysis in this study can be summarised as:

1. The key, general features of the target domain are identified. Here, the key features of the
school case study were identified as complexity, stasis, and evolution.
2. A well understood base analogue is sought. Here it was sought in a range of disciplines
including biology.
3. The target and base are compared to test for a match of the key general features. This is
called the initial mapping.
4. The well understood base anaolgue, here the ecosystem, is then teased out in detail to
identify its salient attributes.
5. The base is then used to interpret the target domain seeking similar, different and
ambiguous relationships. Literal attributes are discarded. In this case the detailed
attributes of a (heath) ecosystem are tested for a match in the school case study. This is
called the detailed mapping. This purpose of this step is to provide new ways of thinking
about or a conceptual framework for theorising about the case under study.
6. The analysis provides a conclusion. In short it answers the question, what do we now
know about the case under study that we did not know before?
The analogical mapping not only rendered the data and system more understandable but also
yielded a model, the ecosystem (well established in biology) to explain the nature of science
education. It may suggest a theory of how 'sustainable change in school science might be
achieved based on principles of ecology principles (Aubusson, 2002). Finally, it allows
predictions, for example,
•
•

that science education might progress through succession resulting in a mosaic of
different forms of science education in different locations; and
that as the science education ecosystem responds to change (however well intentioned) it
may be expected to suffer degradation as well as progression, just as an ecosystem does.

References
Aubusson, P. (1998). Towards an ecology of science education. Unpublished thesis.
University of Technology Sydney.
Aubusson, P. (2002). An ecology of science education. International Journal of Science
Education, 24, 27-46.
Aubusson, P., & Cosgrove, M. (1997). Teacher as technologist. Paper presented at
Australasian Science Education Research Association 28th Annual Conference, 4-7 July,
Adelaide University of South Australia.
Ayala, F. J. (1993). Teleological explanations. In M. Ruse (Ed.), Philosophy of biology
(pp.187-197). Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
Badcock, C. (1995). PsychoDarwinism; The new synthesis of Darwin and Freud. London:
Harper Collis.

Baird, J. R., & Mitchell, I. J. (Eds.). (1986). Improving the quality of teaching and learning:
An Australian case study - The PEEL Project. Melbourne: Monash University.
Baird, J. C., & Northfield, J. R. (Eds.). (1992). Learning from the PEEL experience.
Melbourne: Monash University.
Bell, B. (Ed.). (1993). I know about LISP but how do I put it into practice? Final report of
the Learning in Science Project: Teacher development. Hamilton: Center for Science and
Mathematics Education Research, Waikato University.
Bell, B., & Gilbert, J (1996). Teacher development: A model from science education.
London: Falmer Press.
Bronowski, J. (1973). The ascent of man. London: BBC.
Chenail, R. J. (1997). Keeping things plumb in qualitative research. The Qualitative Report,
3(3). Retrieved February 17, 2002, from http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR3-3/plumb.html
D'Andrade, R. G. (1995). The development of cognitive anthropology. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Drisko, J. W. (1997). Strengthening qualitative studies and reports: Standards to promote
academic integrity. Journal of Social Work Education, 33, 185 -197.
Dunbar, K. (1997). How scientists think: On-line creativity and conceptual change in science.
In T. B. Ward, S. M. Smith & J. Vaid (Eds.), Creative thought ( pp. 461-493). Washington, DC:
American Psychological Association.
Eisenberg. A, (1992). Metaphor in the language of science. Scientific American, 266, 144.
Erickson, F. (1986). Qualitative methods in research on teaching. In M. C. Wittrock (Ed.),
Handbook of research on teaching (3rd ed.) (pp. 119-161). New York: Macmillan.
Garratt, D,. & Hodkinson, P. (1998). Can there be criteria for selecting research criteria? A
hermeneutical analysis of an inescapable dilemma. Qualitative Inquiry, 4, 515-539.
Gentner, D. (1983). Structure mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy. Cognitive
Science, 7, 155-170.
Gentner, D. (1989). The mechanisms of analogical learning. In S. Vasniadou & A. Ortony
(Eds.), Similarity and analogical Reasoning (pp. 199-241). London: Cambridge University
Press.
Gentner, D., Brem, S., Ferguson, R., Wolff, A. Markman, A. B., & Forbus, K. (1997).
Analogy and creativity in the works of Johannes Kepler. In T. B. Ward, S. M. Smith, & J. Vaid
(Eds.), Creative thought (pp. 403-459). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Gick, M. L., & Holyoak, K. J. (1983). Schema induction and analogical transfer. Cognitive
Psychology, 15, 1-38.
Gunstone, R., White, R. T., & Fensham, P. J. (1988). Developments in style and purpose of
research on learning of science. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 25, 513-529.
Hesse, M. (1966). Models and analogies in science. Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press.
Holyoak, K. J., & Thagard, P. (1995). Mental leaps: Analogy in creative thought.
Cambridge: Bradford.
Kearney, M. H. (2001). Levels and application of qualitative research evidence. Research in
Nursing and Health, 24, 145-153.
Kelly, K. (1994). Out of control: the new biology of machines. London: Fourth Estate.
Kurtz, K. J., Gentner, D., & Gunn, V. (1999). Reasoning. In B. M. Bly & D. E. Rumalhart
(Eds.), Cognitive science (pp. 145-200). San Diego: Academic Press.
Lincoln, Y., & Guba, E. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. New York: Sage.
Markman, A. B., & and Gentner, D. (1996). Commonalities and differences in similarity
comparisons. Memory and Cognition, 25, 235-249.
Mayr, E. (1988). Toward a new philosophy of biology: Observations of an evolutionist.
Cambridge, Massachusettes: Belknap.
Miller, G. T. (1975). Living in the environment: Concepts, problems and alternatives.
Belmont: Wadsworth.
Osborne, R., & Freyberg, P. (1985). Learning in science: The implications of children's
science. Auckland: Heinemann.
Plotkin, H. (1994). The nature of knowledge: Concerning adaptations, instinct and the
evolution of intelligence. London: Penguin.
Roberts, D. (1996). What counts as quality in qualitative research? (Guest Editorial). Science
Education, 80, 243-248.
Seale, C. (1999). The quality of qualitative research. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Williams, G. C. (1993). Adaptation and natural selection. In M. Ruse (Ed.), Philosophy of
biology (pp.182-184). Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

Author Note

+

Dr Peter Aubusson is associate professor in science and technology education at University of
Technology, Sydney where he is a member of TLD, (Teachers, Learning and Development
Research Group). His main research interests are educational change and developments in
science and technology education. He can be contacted at Faculty of Education, University of
Technology Sydney and his email is: Peter.Aubusson@uts.edu.au.

Acknowledgements
The author thanks Mark Cosgrove and Lyn Schaverien for their advice on the method considered
in this paper.

